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Many directors and executives are receiving
favorable loans from their corporations.

Executives Raid ing the
Corporate Cookie Jar

by JAYNE W BARNARD

E

VERYONE NEEDS extra cash sometimes. Most
people confronted with this need face limited options. They sell, they save, or they borrow. None
of the options is easy. Borrowing may be the most difficult, especially where the collateral is chancy, the borrower overextended, and the cost of borrowing high.
But business executives frequently find a willing banker right within the walls of their corporate boardroom.
Hundreds of millions of corporate dollars annually are
diverted away from production and expansion in order
to finance personal loans to corporate insiders.
Twenty-five years ago, this was not the case. Corporate
loans to officers and directors were prohibited by law,
except in the case of incorporated banks. The no-loan
statutes were enacted to prevent directors from taking
advantage of their position to grant themselves or their

colleagues unwarranted loans and thus dissipate corporate funds in violation of their trust-a seemingly sensible constraint.
Today, however, only two states continue to prohibit
executive loans from corporate funds. An additional
handful require shareholder ratification for some types
of these loans. Most states, however, require only a pro
forma determination by the board of directors that making the loan will afford some "benefit" to the corporation. In this context, corporate "benefit" is usually interpreted to include the borrower's ability to concentrate on the corporation's affai rs undistracted by the
need to raise personal cash. Some benefit.
The results of these changes in the law have been predictable. A recent study of 152 randomly selected publicly held corporations found that more than one-third
of them had made at least one substantial executive
loan during 1986. These loans-ranging from the
minimum reportable amount of $60,000 to millions of
dollars-were made to finance home purchases, the ex-
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ercise of stock options, investments in other business
ventures, the purchase of commercial property and to
cover undisclosed "personal" needs. Many of the loans
were made at low- or no-interest rates with indefinite
repayment schedules. Some were made with built-in
"forgiveness" schedules, rendering them little more than
executivEl bonus advances.
Executive lending in a privately held corporation is
not uncqmmon. After all, one reason entrepreneurs
incorpor*te is to maximize personal gain while
minimizirg personal risk. So when The Wall Street]ournat repor!ted that while Crazy Eddie, was still a private
company, Eddie Antar, its principal shareholder and
CEO, ha~ "virtually [used] the company as a private
bank;' gr~nting himself $470,000 in interest-free loans,
paying Various family members $75:000 in annual
stipends, ,extending millions of dollars of credit to a sonin-law's tlusiness venture (supplying cassettes to Crazy
Eddie), arjld guaranteeing the six-digit (never repaid) borrowings M still another relative, it was no great shock
and argu~bly nobody's business save the IRS's.
But thej story should be different in the case of publicly held ccilrporations
whose shareholders expect that exI
cess cas~ will be distributed to them in the form of dividends rather than being distributed to already well-paid
executivJs in the guise of loans. Moreover, executive
I
loans have frequently been an early warning signal of
corporat¢ distress. The bankruptcy reporters are full of
tales of i~solvent corporations whose many misjudgments included the extension of substantial insider
loans.
A prime example is Allegheny International, which
entered ~ankruptcy in February 1988 after years of declining fd>rtunes. During fiscal year 1985, in which the
compan~ lost a record $109 million, Allegheny made
more thcin $32 million in low-interest loans to its officers an~ directors, to permit the exercise of stock options and for other personal (and undisclosed) purposes.
LTV, d~ring a year in which it lost $378.2 million and
was forc4d to close its Pennsylvania manufacturing operations, i made an interest-free loan of $965,250 to its
chairmari/CEO to facilitate the exercise of stock options.
Horn Hardart Co., which in 1986 lost $28.4 million
and whose share value had dropped by more than half
since 19$3, in 1984 made and later extended six-figure
personal! loans to two of its top executives.
Recen~ly South mark Corp., whose share value
dropped nearly 70 percent during 1987, announced that
it would i be forced to sell some of its major assets in
order to :raise cash and reduce its heavy debt burden.
Shortly ~efore that announcement, the company disclosed tHat it had provided an $8.5 million line of credit
to its ch~irman and vice chairman "so that [they] would
be able to meet any loan margin calls resulting from
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Call to Action
"None of us likes paying taxes. But all of us recognize the necessity of doing so. And as long as
those taxes are levied as fairly as possible, with an
intelligent regard for their long-term effect on economic growth, they can give us the resources we
need as a community to maintain the schools, hospitals, roads and public agencies that are the framework for free enterprise. I'll go a step further. There
are times when instead of opposing tax increases,
the business community has a duty to support them.
"Consider, for example, the ruinous federal deficits that are destroying our fiscal stability and credibility. We've doubled the national debt in six years.
We've amassed more I.Q.U:s since 1981 than in the
entire previous history of the republic. Historians will
eventually assign the blame for this debacle. There's
plenty to go around.
"In the meantime, we need action, not accusations.
And faced as we are with a national fiscal crisis, I
think some form of federal tax increase is absolutely
justified. In my opinion, the business community
should be breathing fire at Congress and the President over this issue:'

- J.

Richard Munro, chairman
of Time Inc., at the University
of Southern Florida, Tampa,
on November 16, 1987

recent declines in the market price of [Southmark's]
common stock... :' Needless to say, Southmark's
public shareholders were not afforded the same privilege.
It is not likely that the state laws authorizing executive
loans will revert to their earlier prohibitory form. Every
time a state "modernizes" its corporate law, one of the
first changes made is the inclusion of a loan-enabling
provision. The theory, encompassed in the Model Business Corporation Act, is that loans are a necessary
means of attracting top-quality executives. This presumes that worthy candidates for boardroom positions
would take a less attractive job for less money rather
than endure the hardship of having to borrow money
from a flinthearted banker as the other employees do.
In today's business world, the idea that executives
should, like their shareholders, confront the trials of
commercial borrowing, and use corporate funds for cor0
porate needs, is a heretical notion.
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